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Abstract
An expected-net-national-benefit-maximizing enlistment-age is analytically derived
for small countries engaged in external conflicts by considering the effects of the
enlistment age on army size, probability of war, military performance, forgone
civilian output, remunerations in the case of injury or death, and costs of readjusting
to civilian life. The numerical simulations reveal the effects of the model parameters
on

the

expected-net-national-benefit-maximizing

enlistment-age.

Despite

the

substantial changes in parameter values, the computed values of the enlistment age are
distributed within an advanced phase of life.
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1. Introduction

Throughout the course of history countries engaged in external conflicts have
maintained conscript armies with an early enlistment age—a legacy, perhaps, of our
long agrarian past where life expectancy was short and boys were hardened by
physical work, hunting, and protecting their clan’s livestock and crops. Despite the
considerable increase in the number of years of schooling, in life expectancy and in
the average age of marriage, despite the transformation in the structure of households
and earning responsibilities, and despite the changes in warfare technology (which
have made military operations more sedentary and increased the distance of
engagement and the accuracy and potency of munitions), the enlistment-age has not
been significantly changed in countries that have continued practicing compulsory
military service. Modern males are likely to be swift and powerful at eighteen years of
age, but their comfortable upbringing does not prepare them mentally for war.
Enlisted in early age, many experience severe difficulties in coping with national
expectations, hazardous missions and the horror of war.1

The suitability and the morality of an early enlistment-age are also disputed on
political grounds. Most of the pre-service people do not have direct access to political
power. Consequently, they are politically underrepresented and do not have direct
influence on current recruitment laws that hinder their personal security and liberty. In
the absence of adequate, direct political representation, it took years of anti-draft
demonstrations and civil riots to end the conscription in the United States—a super
power and one of the most progressive countries—in mid 1973. Small countries that
1

Anecdotal evidence suggests that in combat situations during World War II only about twenty percent
of the young combatants returned fire. In contrast, one may note the reliable performance of the
middle-age troops in Alexander the Macedonian’s army.
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face severe and close-to-home geopolitical risks cannot afford civil riots. Nor can they
rely on an all-volunteer army. 2 Responsibly, most of their young residents obey the
existing recruitment rules.

The construction of a non ad-hoc enlistment-age rule for small countries
maintaining a conscript defensive army is the objective of this paper. Section 2
presents the relationship between the army size, deterrence capacity, probability of
war and the enlistment age. Section 3 details the expected national benefits and costs
from enlisting at a given age. Section 4 derives the expected-net-national-benefitmaximizing enlistment-age. Section 5 displays the numerical-simulation’s results of
the expected-net-national-benefit-maximizing enlistment-age for a wide range of
parameter-values as well as the effects of the model parameters on this enlistment age.
Section 6 concludes.

2. Enlistment age, army size and war deterrence and probability

One of the main argument in favor of an early enlistment age is that it allows a
country facing geopolitical risks to enjoy a large reserve of trained soldiers. Consider
a country in which military service is compulsory due to hostile geopolitical
conditions. The physically lower-bound on military service age is t min . The physically
upper-bound on military service age coincides with the retirement age, t max . During
peace-periods, the army is a force of conscripts and its size is equal to the size of the

2

Analyses and discussions of the economic issues and the quantity and quality of servicepersons
associated with the choice of a draft or an all-volunteer force are provided by Oi (1967), Altman and
Fechter (1967), Fisher (1969), Altman and Barro (1971), Lee and McKenzie (1992), Ross (1994) and
Warner and Asch (1996, 2001).
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currently enlisted cohort. At wartime the reserves are called. The reserves comprise
all ex-conscripts aged t max and less. Hence, the country’s potential wartime-army is

N (t ) =

tmax

∫ n(τ )dτ

(1)

t

where t ∈ (t min , t max ) denotes the drafting age and n(τ ) the size of the cohort aged τ .
Assuming, for tractability, that all cohorts have an identical size, n, then the wartime
army size is
N (t ) = (t max − t )n .

(2)

Suppose that the opponent is more populous, but possesses the same warfare
technology. For simplicity, its wartime army, N E , is fixed, yet always ready to match
the smaller country’s army: 3

N E = max N (t ) = (t max − t min )n .

(3)

In the absence of warfare technological advantage, size is crucial: the greater the ratio
of the country’s potential wartime army to its rival’s wartime army the higher the
country’s war deterrence. In other words, the probability of war breaking-out
( 0 < p < 1 ) is given by

p(t ) = p max [1 − µ ( N (t ) / N E )]

(4)

where the scalar 0 < µ < 1 is the army’s deterrent gradient, reflecting (with µ ≠ 1 ) that
the probability of war cannot be eliminated, and where 0 < p max < 1 is a scalar
3

A more elaborate, but greatly complicated, framework may consider reaction functions and a
Stackelberg-type equilibrium.

4

denoting the probability of war when the country is unarmed. Recalling equation (2),
the probability of war is rendered as
p(t ) = p max [1 − µ (t max − t ) /(t max − t min )] .

(5)

In this framework, the earlier the enlisting age the greater the country’s wardeterrence and the lower the probability of war. However, additional factors may be
taken into account in setting the enlistment age.

3. Expected net national benefit from enlistment at age t

The expected net national benefit (ENNB) from enlisting a person aged
t ∈ (t min , t max ) is the difference between that person’s military contribution (M) and
the sum of his forgone civil output (C ), his costs of readjusting to civilian life upon
release (S), and the remuneration (including hospitalization costs) in the event of his
injury in war ( R I ) or the remuneration to his kin in the event of his death in war
( R D ). The probabilities of being injured or killed in war are θ and φ ( 0 < θ , φ < 1
and θ + φ < 1 ), respectively, and the probability of war is given by equation (5). Thus,
the expected net national benefit from enlisting a person aged t is expressed as
ENNB (t ) = M (t ) − C (t ) − S (t ) − p(t )[θR I (t ) + φR D (t )]

(6)

where M, C, S, R I and R D are measured in present-value nominal units.

Consistent with the life-cycle hypothesis (Ando and Modigliani, 1963;
Modigliani, 1966), a person’s military contribution and civil output are assumed to be
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twice differentiable and single-peaked in the interval (t min , t max ) . Similarly, the
remuneration paid to kin for a conscript killed in war at age t is taken to be twice
differentiable and single-peaked in the interval (t min , t max ) . For convenience, the
following second-order polynomials are considered:
M (t ) = M tmax + α (t max − t ) − α~ (t max − t ) 2

(7)

~
C (t ) = C tmax + β (t max − t ) − β (t max − t ) 2

(8)

R D (t ) = R D tmax + γ (t max − t ) − γ~ (t max − t ) 2

(9)

where, M tmax , C tmax and R D t max are the military contribution and civil output of a
person aged t max and the remuneration to kin for the loss of such a person,
~
respectively, and (α , α~ ), ( β , β ), (γ , γ~ ) are pairs of positive scalars, expressed in
present-value nominal units, determining the marginal effect of youth and its
evolution on military contribution, civil output and death remuneration, respectively.

Let t m* ∈ (t min , t max ) and t c* ∈ (t min , t max ) be the prime ages as regards military
contribution and civil output, respectively, and t d* ∈ (t min , t max ) the age of death
associated with maximum remuneration to kin,4 then
M ′(t m* ) = −α + 2α~ (t max − t m* ) = 0

(10)

~
C ′(t c* ) = − β + 2 β (t max − t c* ) = 0

(11)

4

t d* may be determined by a combination of the number of life-years lost and the number and age

composition of dependents.
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R D ' (t d* ) = −γ + 2γ~ (t max − t d* ) = 0

(12)

and implying

α~ =

0.5α
t max − t m*

(13)

~
β =

0.5 β
t max − t c*

(14)

γ~ =

0.5γ
.
t max − t d*

(15)

Consequently, the military contribution of a person aged t is given by
M (t ) = M tmax + α [1 − 0.5(t max − t ) /(t max − t m* )](t max − t )

(16)

his forgone civil output by
C (t ) = C tmax + β [1 − 0.5(t max − t ) /(t max − t c* )](t max − t )

(17)

and the remuneration to his remaining kin in the event of being killed at t is
R D (t ) = R D tmax + γ [1 − 0.5(t max − t ) /(t max − t d* )](t max − t ) .

(18)

It is assumed that in addition to an initial nominal cost R̂ I (in present value)
of hospitalization, a time-invariant (in present value) remuneration, δ , is paid each
instance to an injured person, or to his remaining closest relative, over a period that is
equal to the potential remaining life expectancy had there been no injury, T − t . That
is, the rehabilitation costs of a person injured at age t are given by
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R I (t ) = Rˆ I + δ (T − t ) .

(19)

The costs of adjusting to civilian life for a released soldier are represented by
S (t ) = Sˆ + λt

(20)

where λ is a positive (negative) scalar if the difficulty in adjusting to civilian life
increases (decreases) with the conscripted soldier’s age, and where Ŝ is an ageinsensitive portion of the adjustment costs.

By substituting equations (16) to (20) and equation (5) into equation (6), the
expected net national benefit from military service at age t can be rendered as:

ENNB (t ) = M tmax − C tmax − Sˆ − λt − θp max [1 − µ (t max − t ) /(t max − t min )]Rˆ I
− φp max [1 − µ (t max − t ) /(t max − t min )]R D tmax
+ {α − β − φp max [1 − µ (t max − t ) /(t max − t min )]γ }(t max − t )
− {θp max [1 − µ (t max − t ) /(t max − t min )]δ }(T − t )
 α
[φp max [1 − µ (t max − t ) /(t max − t min )]γ
β
− 0.5
−
−
*
*
t max − t d*
 t max − t m t max − t c


2
 (t max − t )

.(21)

4. ENNB-maximizing enlistment-age

Let t o denote the arg max{ ENNB (t )} . Recalling equation (20), the necessary
and sufficient conditions for interior solution are:
2
~
− (a~t o − b t o + ~
c) = 0

(22)

~
b − 2a~t o < 0

(23)

where,

8

a~ ≡

~
b ≡

1.5γµφp max

(24)

(t max − t d* )(t max − t min )

µp max
t max − t min


3φγt max 
β
α
+
−
 2(θδ + φγ ) +
* 
*
t max − t d  t max − t c t max − t m*


(25)

and

c~ ≡ (α − β + λ ) +

p max
{θδ [ µ (T + t max ) − 1] + µ (θRˆ I + φRtDmax )}
t max − t min

2
 β

2γφµp max
1.5γφµp max t max
γφp max
α
t
+
+
+
−
+
*
*
*  max
(t max − t min )(t max − t d* )
 t max − t c t max − t d t max − t min t max − t m 

.(2

If the second-order condition (23) is satisfied, the expected net-nationalbenefit maximizing enlistment age is given by

t1o, 2

~
~
b ± b 2 − 4a~c~
=
.
2a~

(27)

If the second-order condition (23) is not satisfied, the expected net-national-benefit
maximizing

enlistment

age

ENNB (t min ) > ENNB (t max ) )

is
or

either
the

the

minimum

maximum

age

age

t min
t max

(when
(when

ENNB (t min ) < ENNB (t max ) ).

5. Numerical simulations

The numerical simulation of the expected net-national-benefit maximizing
enlistment-age formula (26) considers a country where t min = 18 years, t max = 65
years, and T = 80 years. The main simulation was performed with medium parameter

9

values for that country. These medium parameters values and the simulation result are
presented in bold numbers by the middle column of Table 1. The nominal figures are
per annum.

[Insert Table 1 here]
The effects of the model parameters on the ENNB maximizing enlistment age
can be assessed by inspecting the rest of the table’s columns. The entries in these
columns are computed by changing the value of one parameter at a time from its
medium level while holding the rest of the parameters at their medium levels.

In all of the numerical simulations the interior solution was only obtained with
~
~
t o = (b − b 2 − 4a~~
c ) / 2a~ and, reasonably, as long as β sufficiently exceeds α + λ .
In the absence of a clear assessment of the relationship between released soldiers’
costs of adjusting to civilian life and age, the medium value of λ was set to be equal
to zero.

Despite the substantial parameter change, the numerical simulations reveal
that the ENNB maximizing enlistment-age results are quite tightly distributed around
the value obtained with the medium parameter-value vector—55.714 years of age.

The numerical simulations reveal that the ENNB maximizing enlistment age
rises with the probability of war when the country is unarmed ( p max ), with the
probability of being killed in war ( φ ), with the probability of being injured in war
(θ ), with the army’s war-deterrence gradient ( µ ), with the prime-age of people’s
civilian production ( t c* ), with the age of death associated with maximum
remuneration to kin ( t d* ), with the military performance/youth coefficient (α ), with
10

the death remuneration/youth coefficient (γ ), with the annual remuneration extended
to injured soldiers (δ ), with the correlation between costs of adjusting to civilian life
and age ( λ ), and with the hospitalization costs of injured soldiers. The ENNB
maximizing enlistment age declines with the prime-age of people’s military
performance ( t m* ) and with the civil performance/youth coefficient ( β ).

Finally, when the upper-bound on recruiting age is lowered from 65 to 60 the
ENNB-maximizing enlistment-age drops slightly to 53.725. When the upper-bound is
further reduced to 55 or 50, the ENNB-maximizing enlistment-age is reduced to
51.426 and 48.632, respectively.

6. Concluding remarks
Although enlisting at eighteen years of age maximizes army size and, in turn,
war-deterrence, its application is not necessarily in the best interest of a nation. This
paper demonstrated that when socioeconomic factors are taken into account, the
expected net national benefit is maximized by enlisting people in a mature phase of
their life. This non-orthodox recommendation can be supported by the fact that during
the years that have passed since World War I warfare has become much more
sedentary and technical. During the same period, awareness to fitness and health
services have been improved, life expectancy have been increased, household
structure has been changed, and the role of men as bread-earners and family-heads has
been diminished.
There may be other arguments in favor of enlisting at mature, middle age. The
most important one is the morality of risking very young people who have not
contributed significantly to the evolution of their country geopolitical difficulties, who
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have not tasted much of life, and who may play a significant role in the advancement
of their nation and the world.
A compromise between this paper’s non-orthodox recommendation and the
current practice in countries maintaining a conscript army is a policy of mature-age
compulsory military service (say, of one year—a period comparable to a sabbatical or
temporary leave allowed in many places of employment) augmented by an initial
military training and non-combatant service (say, of one year) at early age (say,
eighteen) and refreshing training sessions (say, of up to four weeks per year)
commanded by volunteer career-officers and supported by volunteer professional
staff, so as to increase a small country’s war-potential army and war-deterrence
capacity, and where young-soldiers units are deployed to the frontline and battle as
the last, rather than the first, resort.
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Table 1: The numerical simulations’ results
Parameter
&
Enlisting
age
p max
t o (years)
φ
o

t (years)
θ
t o (years)
µ
t o (years)
t m* (years)
t o (years)
t c* (years)
t o (years)
t d* (years)
to
α
to
β

(years)
(dollars)
(years)
(dollars)

t o (years)
γ (dollars)
t o (years)
δ (dollars)
t o (years)
λ (dollars)
t o (years)
R̂ I (dollars)
t o (years)

Very Low

Low

Medium

High

Very High

0.1
51.228

0.25
52.985

0.5
55.714

0.75
58.230

0.9
59.651

0.01
52.441

0.025
53.691

0.05
55.714

0.075
57.670

0.1
59.571

0.01
54.533
0.1
53.312
25
56.668

0.05
55.071
0.25
54.253
30
56.284

0.1
55.714
0.5
55.714
35
55.714

0.15
56.327
0.75
57.059
40
54.779

0.2
56.912
0.9
57.817
45
52.963

30
42.679

40
52.208

45
55.714

50
58.634

60
63.193

20
54.867

30
55.352

35
55.714

40
56.220

50
58.226

500
50.881
2000
64.855

1000
52.975
2500
58.903

1500
55.714
3000
55.714

2000
59.454
3500
53.720

2500
64.887
4000
52.354

1000
53.443

2500
54.310

5000
55.714

7,500
57.071

10,000
58.386

1000
55.074
-1,000
46.608
25,000
55.349

2500
55.320
-500
51.149
50,000
55.471

5000
55.714
0
55.714
100,000
55.714

7500
56.089
500
60.305
150,000
55.958

10,000
56.447
1,000
64.922
200,000
56.201
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